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When	white	working-class	men	feel	society	no	longer
values	them
The	Brexit	referendum	exposed	deep	political	divisions	within	British	society,	and	more	than	a	year	after	that	vote,
those	divisions	show	no	signs	of	disappearing.	Although	the	Leave	campaign	was	carried	to	victory	on	the	back	of	a
broad	coalition,	one	of	its	striking	features	was	high	levels	of	support	for	Brexit	among	white	working-class	men
without	a	college	education	–	a	group	that	is	also	especially	likely	to	vote	for	right-populist	candidates	in	other
countries.	Why	is	there	such	strong	support	for	right-populist	causes	and	candidates	among	the	white	working	class?
In	both	the	media	and	scholarly	commentary,	discussion	of	this	issue	has	been	dominated	by	a	debate	about
whether	rising	support	for	right	populism	is	rooted	in	economic	or	cultural	developments.	On	the	one	hand,	some
interpret	support	for	right-wing	populism	as	a	rejection	of	multicultural	discourse	and	post-materialist	values.	On	the
other	hand,	other	analysts	emphasise	the	degree	to	which	support	for	populism	is	linked	with	economic
distress	and	insecurity.	With	regard	to	Brexit,	the	former	present	evidence	that	those	in	the	Leave	camp	were	driven
by	perceived	cultural	threats	to	national	identity,	while	the	latter	point	out	that	regional	unemployment	was	strongly
associated	with	support	for	leaving	the	European	Union.
However,	we	think	that	asking	whether	economic	or	cultural	developments	were	more	important	to	such	outcomes	is
to	ask	the	wrong	question.	There	are	good	reasons	for	believing	that	economic	and	cultural	developments	have
operated	together	to	increase	support	for	populism.	The	more	important	question,	then,	is	not	whether	populism	is
driven	by	either	economic	or	cultural	factors	—	but	rather	how	economic	and	cultural	forces	might	combine	to	shape
the	populist	politics	of	our	time.
In	a	recent	article	published	in	the	British	Journal	of	Sociology,	we	propose	that	one	way	to	understand	how
economic	and	cultural	factors	interact	is	to	see	support	for	Brexit	and	right	populism	more	generally	among	the	white
working	class	as	a	reflection	of	status	anxiety	rooted	in	broader	processes	of	social	marginalisation.	We	support	this
argument	using	survey	data	collected	across	Western	democracies	between	1987	and	2014	as	part	of	the
International	Social	Survey	Programme.
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Our	focus	is	on	subjective	social	status,	namely,	a	person’s	sense	that	they	are	accorded	the	social	respect	or	status
associated	with	full	membership	in	society.	There	are	good	reasons	for	thinking	that	economic	and	cultural
developments	have	combined	to	depress	the	subjective	social	status	of	white	working-class	men.	Since	social	status
is	typically	conferred	by	levels	of	income	and	the	quality	of	one’s	occupation,	shifting	patterns	of	employment	that
have	eliminated	well-paid,	medium-skill	jobs	and	forced	many	men	into	more	precarious	positions	may	well	have
undercut	their	own	sense	of	where	they	stand	in	society.	At	the	same	time,	shifts	in	cultural	frameworks,	marked	by
an	increasing	emphasis	in	mainstream	discourse	on	racial	and	gender	equality,	may	have	threatened	the	subjective
social	status	of	any	who	may	have	relied	on	the	notion	that	they	were	white	or	male	to	underpin	their	own	sense	of
social	standing.
Thus,	economic	and	cultural	developments	happening	independently	of	each	other	may	have	combined	to
have	additive	effects	on	the	social	status	of	some	groups.	But	there	may	also	be	 interactive	effects	at	work	here.	For
instance,	movement	toward	a	knowledge	economy	has	increased	the	demand	for	highly-skilled	workers	and	the
wage	premium	to	college	degrees,	putting	people	without	such	a	degree	at	an	economic	disadvantage.	But,	as	more
people	acquire	such	degrees,	the	social	esteem	accorded	those	who	lack	one	may	well	have	fallen.	In	this	case,	a
particular	set	of	economic	developments	sets	in	motion	changes	in	cultural	frameworks	that	multiply	the	effects.
If	these	conjectures	are	correct,	we	should	expect	to	see	some	decline	in	the	subjective	social	status	of	men	without
a	college	education	over	the	past	few	decades,	and	that	is	what	we	find	in	this	study	of	twelve	developed
democracies.	We	measured	social	status	using	a	question	that	asked	survey	respondents	to	place	themselves	on	a
social	ladder	reflecting	whether	they	were	closer	to	the	top	or	bottom	of	society.	In	almost	every	country	within	our
sample,	men	without	a	college	education	reported	lower	levels	of	relative	social	status	in	2014	than	they	did	two	or
three	decades	before.	These	declines	were	modest	but	remarkably	consistent.
Figure.	The	relative	social	status	of	men	without	a	college	education	circa	1990	and	2014
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Note:	Start	period	for	Germany,	Sweden,	Norway,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovenia	is	1992;	end	period	for	UK	and	Hungary	is
2009.	Otherwise	start	period	is	1987	and	end	period	is	2014.	Source:	ISSP	Surveys;	Gidron	and	Hall	2017.
Is	this	decline	in	subjective	social	status	reflected	in	support	for	the	populist	right?	We	think	there	are	good	reasons
to	believe	it	is.	Previous	work	in	sociology	has	demonstrated	that	people	care	just	as	much	about	social	status	as
they	do	about	money.	Thus,	working-class	voters	who	feel	their	social	status	is	eroding	may	well	turn	against	the
mainstream	parties	who	have	presided	over	that;	and	they	may	well	be	inclined	toward	candidates	who	promise	to
restore	that	status,	as	many	on	the	populist	right	do.	Donald	Trump	appealed	directly	to	such	concerns,	for	instance,
with	language	evident	in	this	campaign	speech:
While	my	opponent	slanders	you	as	deplorable	and	irredeemable,	I	call	you	hardworking	American	patriots	who	love
your	country	and	want	a	better	future	for	all	of	our	people.	You	are	mothers	and	fathers,	soldiers	and	sailors,
carpenters	and	welders	[…]	You	are	Americans	and	you	are	entitled	to	leadership	that	honors	you,	cherishes	you,
and	defends	you.	Every	American	is	entitled	to	be	treated	with	dignity	and	respect	in	our	country.
In	line	with	this,	we	find	that,	across	the	developed	democracies,	lower	levels	of	subjective	social	status	are	strongly
associated	with	voting	for	right-wing	populist	parties.	Moreover,	people	who	express	lower	levels	of	social	standing
also	express	higher	levels	of	political	alienation	(reflected	in	the	belief	that	one	has	to	be	corrupt	in	order	to	succeed
in	life)	and	deeper	opposition	to	immigration	–	an	attitude	important	to	the	populist	right	and	the	Leave	campaign.	We
think	there	is	real	promise	in	approaching	support	for	the	populist	right	as	a	problem	of	social	integration,	born	of
economic	and	cultural	developments	that	have	led	some	groups	of	people	to	feel	increasingly	marginal	to
mainstream	society.
These	findings	also	carry	implications	for	how	the	populist	challenge	can	be	addressed.	Much	of	the	current
discussion	is	focused	on	providing	better	material	compensation	for	the	‘losers’	of	globalisation,	often	in	the	form	of
more	generous	programs	of	redistribution.	Yet	our	research	suggests	that	support	for	populism	is	not	motivated
primarily	by	demands	for	more	redistribution	but	by	more	fundamental	concerns	about	social	recognition	and	respect.
Since	social	recognition	is	closely-linked	to	having	a	decent	job,	addressing	those	concerns	will	require	efforts	to
create	such	jobs	and	to	make	existing	jobs	more	decent.	But	it	will	also	require	efforts	on	the	symbolic	plane	of
political	discourse	to	ensure	that	people	in	all	walks	of	life	are	recognised	as	valued	members	of	society.
♣♣♣
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